HARRIS, STEPHEN L.
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 3/1998, pág. 526
1. Theoretical underpinnings: Politics and economics of interests and regulation. a) Regulatory capture. b) Some final theoretical considerations. 2. The case study of canadian liberalization. a) The stimulus forchange. b) The OSC hearings: The industry-regulator debate. c) The ingredients shaping the OSC decision. d) The industryreaction...
1. Theoretical underpinnings: Politics and economics of interests and regulation. a) Regulatory capture. b) Some final theoretical considerations. 2. The case study of canadian liberalization. a) The stimulus forchange. b) The OSC hearings: The industry-regulator debate. c) The ingredients shaping the OSC decision. d) The industryreaction to the OSC decision. e) Another impulse for change:a new chairman of the OSC. 3. The Policy Change. a) DecisionI: The first slice. b) Decision II: Phased but total liberalization. 4. Conclusion.
THE POLITICS OF POLICY: PROSPECTS AND REALITIES
DESAI, UDAY;HOLDEN, MATTHEW;SHELLEY, MACK
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 3/1998, pág. 423
1. An Agenda. a) Using what we already know. b)What policy is worth studying? c) What do we want to know,and why? d) Political naïveté and political maturity ofjudgment. e) Public and private power. f) Political feasibility and viability. 2. This symposium. a) Anoverview. b) The individual articles. 3. Conclusion.
RAHM, DIANNE
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 4/1998, pág. 679
1. Nuclear and chemical weapons. 2. Managing toxicwaste cleanup. 3. Toxic waste as a local issue.
THE POLITICS OF WATERSHED POLICYMAKING
WOOLEY, JOHN T.;MCGINNIS, MICHAEL VICENT
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 3/1999, pág. 578
1. The Salmon crisis: The rise of watershedorganization in three rivers. 2. Case studies. 3. Casecomparison based on survey data. 4. Summary.
THE PROBLEMS OF A PALESTINE THAT WOULD BE ECONOMICALLY AUTONOMOUS: A COMMENTARY
SHARKANSKY, IRA
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 4/1999, pág. 665
1. A geography that does not support autonomy. 2.Doubts with respect to outside aid or trading partners. 3.A contrary analysis.
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC INPUT IN STATE WELFARE POLICYMAKING
SHAW, GREG M.
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 4/2000, pág. 707
1. Research Method. 2. Findings. 3. Conclusions.
THE SEATTLE COMMONS: A CASE STUDY IN THE POLITICS AND PLANNING OF AN URBAN VILLAGE
IGLITZIN, LYNNE B.
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 4/1995, pág. 620
1. Introduction. 2. Methodology. 3. The Proposal. 4. The Vision. 5. The Arena. 6. The Growth Management Climate and Political Realities. 7. The Players. 8. The Strategies. 9. The Opposition. 10. The Plan Evolves. a)ìStage I (1991-1992). b) Stage II (Early-1993). c) Stage III (Late-1993). 11. Conclusion.
THE STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT OF THE URBAN GROWTH COALITION: THE VIEW FROM THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ELKINS, DAVID R.
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 4/1995, pág. 583
1. Urban Theory and the Growth Coalition. a) Unitary Theory. b) Growth Machine. c) Regime Theory. 2. Data and Methods. 3. Findings. 4. Factor Analysis. 5. Coalitional Differences Between Central Cities and Suburbs. 6. Conclusion.
THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM REGULATORY PROCEDURES, 1978-1998
ANDERSON, JAMES E.
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 3/1998, pág. 482
1. The carter administration and regulatory reform. a) The legislative veto. b) The bumpers amendment. c) Hybridrulemaking. d) Ex parte communictions. e) Competitive improvements. f) Regulatory policy board. g) Regulatory flexibility. 2. The reagan administration and regulatory reform. 3. Reprise, 1995-1996. 3. Concluding comments.
THE SUNLAND PARK/CAMINO REAL PARTNERSHIP: LANDFILL POLITICS IN A BORDER COMMUNITY
ROSELL, ELLEN
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 1/1996, pág. 111
1. Introduction. 2. Local dump to regulated landfill. 3. Nu-Mex/JOAB/ Camino Real: A corporate Citizen?. 4. City of sunland park: Political acquiescence or Economic pragmatism?. 5. Concerned citizens of sunland park: NIMBY or savvy risk assessors?. 6.Whose Community?. 7. Lessons from the public/Private landfill partnership.
THE SUPREME COURT AS A POLICY ARENA: THE STRATEGIES AND TACTIES OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
WALTENBURG, ERIC N.;SWINFORD, BILL
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 2/1999, pág. 242
1. Goal of this research. 2. The making of the"Pro-state" Court. 3. The advocacy of the state attorneysgeneral. 4. The perceptions and strategies of stateattorneys General. 5. Conclusions.
NOWNES, ANTHONY;NEELEY, GRANT
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 1/1996, pág. 74
1. Introduction. 2. Theoretical Background. 3. The data. 4. Findings. 5. Discussion and conclusions. 6. Concluding remarks.
HAIGHT, DAVID;GINGER, CLARE
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 4/2000, pág. 739
1. Participatory Policy Analysis. 2. Vermont FRAC.3. Research Design, Data, and Methods. 4. Factors, Relatedto Trust and Understanding. 5. Workgroup Case Findings. 6.Implications.
UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR TIME LIMITS AND OTHER WELFARE REFORMS
PEREIRA, JOSEPH A.;VAN RYZIN, GREGG G.
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 3/1998, pág. 398
1. Background. 2. Data and measures. 3. Analysis and results. 4. Discussion and conclusion.
WATSON, SHEILAH S.
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 4/1995, pág. 652
1. Enterprise Zones as an Economic Development Tool: Issues and Concerns. 2. Methodology. 3. Results of Analysis. 4. Conclusión.
WHEN BUSINESSES COLLIDE: PRODUCER INTEREST GROUPS AND THE POLITICS OF REGULATION.
CAMPBELL, HEATHER E.
POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, n.º 2/1998, pág. 310
1. Considering business intervention. a) Businesses do intervene in rate cases. 2. Modeling the effect of business intervention. a) Different types of business intervention. b) The statiscal model. c) Predictions regarding the relative power of business intervention. 3. Findings. a) Comparing results with and without business interveners....
1. Considering business intervention. a) Businesses do intervene in rate cases. 2. Modeling the effect of business intervention. a) Different types of business intervention. b) The statiscal model. c) Predictions regarding the relative power of business intervention. 3. Findings. a) Comparing results with and without business interveners. b) Estimated effects of potential competitor intervention. c) Estimated effects of business customer intervention - regulated firms are strategic.