Síguenos en los medios sociales
CANAN, PENELOPE;REICHMAN, NANCY
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 1/1993, pág. 61
1. Introduction. 2. Encouraging ozone partnershipsìand deals. 3. The structure of ozone deals. 4. Implicationsìfor global power.
PAYING WORKERS OR PAYING LAWYERS: EMPLOYEE TERMINATION PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
NIELSEN, LAURA BETH
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 3/1999, pág. 247
1. Introduction and overview. 2. Personneltermination at PCO: the role of corporate culture and "humanresources" policy. a) National differences in law. b)Corporate culture. 3. Legal, organizational, and proceduraloutcomes. 4. Perception of legal risk. 5. Conclusion.
POLES APART: INDUSTRIAL WASTE MANAGEMENT REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
AOKI, KAZUMASU;CIOFFI, JOHN W.
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 3/1999, pág. 213
1. Introduction. 2. The company. 3. Generalenvironmental issues in the United States: the salience oflegal costs. 4. General environmental issues in Japan: theinternational political economy of environmental management.5. Waste management regulation in the United States:adversarialism by prescription. 6. Waste managementregulation in Japan....
1. Introduction. 2. The company. 3. Generalenvironmental issues in the United States: the salience oflegal costs. 4. General environmental issues in Japan: theinternational political economy of environmental management.5. Waste management regulation in the United States:adversarialism by prescription. 6. Waste managementregulation in Japan. 7. Attitudes, institutions, andenvironmental regulation in Japan and the United States. 8.Adversarial and cooperative regulatory regimes compared. 9.Conclusion.
PREDICTING BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1990 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
DROTNING, LUCY;ROTHENBERG, LAWRENCE S.
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 1/1999, pág. 1
1. Introduction. 2. Predicting congressional intentto control.3. Testing the intent to control model. 4. Policyenvironments, legislative preferences, and politicalcontrol.
PRIVATE INTERSTS SEEKING PUNISHMENT: PROSECUTION BROUGHT BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS IN SPAIN.
PÉREZ GIL, JULIO
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 2/2003, pág. 151 a 171
1. INTRODUCCIÓN 2. PRIVATE PROSECUTION IN SPAIN: FROM ROMAN LAW TO THE PRESENT 3. LEGITIMATION: WHO CAN PROSECUTE? 4. THE PRACTICE OF PRIVATE PROSECUTION IN SPAIN 5. REASONS ADDUCED FOR THE SUSTENANCE OF PRIVATE PROSECUTION 6. CONCLUSION: WHAT FUTURE FOR PRIVATE PROSECUTIONS?
VARIOS
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 2/2001, pág. 121
1. Introduction: problem-solving courts. 2.Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer. 3. Context andChange: The Evolution of Pioneering Drug Courts in Portlandand Las Vegas (1991-1998). 4. Implementing the KeyComponents of Specialized Drug Treatment Courts: Practiceand Policy considerations. 5. Building a Better Youth Court.6. Who is Diverted?...
1. Introduction: problem-solving courts. 2.Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer. 3. Context andChange: The Evolution of Pioneering Drug Courts in Portlandand Las Vegas (1991-1998). 4. Implementing the KeyComponents of Specialized Drug Treatment Courts: Practiceand Policy considerations. 5. Building a Better Youth Court.6. Who is Diverted? Case Selection for Court-MonitoredMental Health Treatment. 7. Assessing the Costs and BenefitsAccruing to the Public From a Graduated Sanctions Programfor Drug-Using Defendants.
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND DUTCH VICTIM POLICY
WEMMERS, JO-ANNE
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 1/1998, pág. 57
1. Introduction. 2. Dutch victim policy. 3. Procedural justice. 4. Question to be addressed. 5. Method. 6. Results. 7. Discussion and conclusions.
PUBLIC GOOD, PRIVATE PROTECTIONS: COMPETING VALUES IN GERMAN TRANSPLANTATION LAW
HOGLE, LINDA F.
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 2/2002, pág. 115
I. Introduction. II. German organ transplantation policy in context. III. The use of human bodies and the public good: the making of transplant law. IV. Legislating the roles of the body and society. V. Discussion: competing rights, values, and meanings of the body.
DOTAN, YOAV
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 4/1999, pág. 401
1. Introduction. 2. The research. 3. Analysis. 4.Conclusion.
WEINBERG, ADAM S.;GOULD, KENNETH A.
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 2/1993, pág. 139
1. Structural approaches and regulatory cultures:ìrefining a research question. 2. The wetland watchers. 3.ìStructural elements and institutional roles of regulatoryìarenas: the treadmill of environmental regulation. 4.ìDimensionality of environmental regulation: arenas, actors,ìactions, relationships, resources, and culture...
RECOVERING FROM THE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR WELFARE REFORM POLICY
MURPHY, PATRICIA A.
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 2/1997, pág. 169
1. Introduction. 2. A short history of ptsd. 3. The DSM-IV definition of PTSD. 4. Battered woman syndrome. 5. PTSD, welfare-to-work programs, and labor market participation. 6. The recovery or the rehabilitation process explaining PTSD to the survivor. 7. Incorporating these principles into welfare-to-work programs. 8. Forces working against...
1. Introduction. 2. A short history of ptsd. 3. The DSM-IV definition of PTSD. 4. Battered woman syndrome. 5. PTSD, welfare-to-work programs, and labor market participation. 6. The recovery or the rehabilitation process explaining PTSD to the survivor. 7. Incorporating these principles into welfare-to-work programs. 8. Forces working against the recognition of PTSD in the welfare-to-work process. 9. Welfare policy.
REGULATION AND IN-COMPANY ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS
AALDERS, MARIUS
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 2/1993, pág. 75
1. Introduction. 2. Theories of social control. 3.ìTheories of social control and styles of environmental lawìenforcement. 4. Towards understanding the enforcementìparadox. 5. Internal company environmental management: anìalternative regulatory strategy. 6. Conclusion: the polluterìand enforced self-regulation.
REGULATION BY REWARD: ON THE USE OF INCENTIVES AS REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS
GRABOSKY, P. N.
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 3/1995, pág. 257
1. Introduction. 2. Types of incentive. a) Value. material or symbolic. 3. The advantages of incentives as regulatory instruments. a) Freedom-enhancement. b) Legitimacy. c) Educational and promotional value. d) Necessity. e) Organizational enhancement. 4. The shortcomings of incentives as regulatory instruments. a) Contraints on freedom...
REGULATOR-REQUIRED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM AUDITS.
PARKER, CHRISTINE
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 3/2003, pág. 221 a 244
1. INTRODUCTION. 2. WHAT IS THE OBJECT OF THE COMPLIANCE AUDIT? 3. WHAT VIEW IS PROVIDED?. 4. EVIDENCE. 5. INDEPENDENCE OF AUDITORS. 6. CONCLUSION: COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND DEMOCRATIC REGULATION.
GRABE, SYLVIA
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 1/1991, pág. 55
1. Introduction. 2. Policy formulation. 3.ìImplementation. 4. Conclusion.
REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN
KITAMURA, YOSHINOBU
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 3/2000, pág. 305
1. Introduction. 2. Regulatory enforcement style:formal measure oriented, informal measure oriented, andretreatism. 3. An overview of research in Japan: theprevalence of informal measures-oriented enforcement. 4.Explaining variables for informal measure-orientedenforcement. 5. Conclusion.
MILHAUPT, CURTIS J.;MILLER, GEOFFREY P.
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 3/2000, pág. 245
Introduction. 1. Regulatory interaction in japanesefinance. 2. The jusen problem. 3. Resolving the problem. 4.Analysis and conclusions.
REGULATORY PLURALISM: DESIGNING POLICY MIXES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
GUNNINGHAM, NEIL;SINCLAIR, DARREN
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 1/1999, pág. 49
1. Introduction. 2. Methodological constraints. 3.Instrument mixes. 4. Conclusion.
KRAMER, JOHN H.
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 4/1998, pág. 527
1. Introduction. 2. Rejoinder. 3. Conclusion. 4. Notes. 5. References.
CIOFFI, JOHN W.
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 4/2002, pág. 355
I. Introduction. II. Origins of the KonTraG: the structural problems in German Company Law. III. The control and transparency act (Kontrag). IV. The new legal infrastructure: company law, financial market reform, and labor relations. V. Unwinding Germany inc.?: the Mannesmann takeover and tax reform. VI. Backlash and the spillover effect:...
I. Introduction. II. Origins of the KonTraG: the structural problems in German Company Law. III. The control and transparency act (Kontrag). IV. The new legal infrastructure: company law, financial market reform, and labor relations. V. Unwinding Germany inc.?: the Mannesmann takeover and tax reform. VI. Backlash and the spillover effect: the EU takeover directive debacle, the German takeover law, and the limits of the liberalism. VII. Conclusion.
VARIOS
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 3/2001, pág. 269
1. School Violence: Incidence, Legal Context,School Response, and prevention. 2. Using Student RiskFactors in School Violence Surveillance Reports:Illustrative Examples for Enhanced Policy Formation,Implementation, and Evaluation. 3. The Legal Context ofSchool Violence: The Effectiveness of Federal, State, andLocal Law Enforcement Efforts...
1. School Violence: Incidence, Legal Context,School Response, and prevention. 2. Using Student RiskFactors in School Violence Surveillance Reports:Illustrative Examples for Enhanced Policy Formation,Implementation, and Evaluation. 3. The Legal Context ofSchool Violence: The Effectiveness of Federal, State, andLocal Law Enforcement Efforts to Reduce Gun Violence inSchools. 4. School Violence Prevention: Current Status andPolicy Recommendations. 5. Legislating School CrisisResponse: Good Policy or Just Good Politics?. 6. SchoolViolence: Trends, Risk Factors, Prevention, andRecommendations.
SELF-REGULATION VERSUS COMMAND AND CONTROL? BEYOND FALSE DICHOTOMIES
SINCLAIR, DARREN
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 4/1997, pág. 529
1. Introduction. 2. Regulatory variables. 3. Regulatory compulsion. a) Well-organized and committed industry representation. b) A strong culture of regulatory resistance. c) Irreversible or acute environmental threats. 4. Regulatory flexibility. a) Large differences in the marginal cost of abatement. b). Rapid technological turnover. c) The...
1. Introduction. 2. Regulatory variables. 3. Regulatory compulsion. a) Well-organized and committed industry representation. b) A strong culture of regulatory resistance. c) Irreversible or acute environmental threats. 4. Regulatory flexibility. a) Large differences in the marginal cost of abatement. b). Rapid technological turnover. c) The size and resources of firms. d) Persistent irrational actors. e) Acute environmental dangers. 5. Industry design input. a) A strong culture of regulatory resistance.
HUNT, KIM
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 4/1998, pág. 465
1. Introduction. 2. Stages of the policy analysis process. 3. Role of computer simulation in evaluating policy alternatives. 4. Types of forecasting models. 5. Mechanincs of simulation. 6. Review of selected simulation models. 7. Virginia's commission and the budget process. 8. Conclusion. 9. Notes. 10. References.
SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AUDITS: CHALLENGING OR DEFENDING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE?
COURVILLE, SASHA
LAW AND POLICY, n.º 3/2003, pág. 269 a 299
1. INTRODUCTION. 2. THE RISE OF SOCIAL AUDITING. 3. FLO AND SAI CASE STUDIES. 4. SOCIAL AUDITING THROUGH THE LENSES OF TRUST, ACCOUNTABILITY, OWNERSHIP, AND REFLEXIVITY. 5. CONCLUSION.
